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This paper studies why multinational ﬁrms often share ownership of a
foreign aﬃliate with a local partner even in the absence of government
restrictions on ownership. We show that shared ownership may arise, if (i)
the partner owns assets that are potentially important for the investment
project, and (ii) the value of these assets is private information. In this
context shared ownership acts as a screening device. Our model predicts
that the multinational’s ownership share is increasing in its productivity,
with the most productive multinationals choosing not to rely on a foreign
partner at all. This prediction is shown to be consistent with data on the
ownership choices of Japanese multinationals.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: F23, L20.
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How the ownership of productive assets should be allocated is a central issue
in the theory of the ﬁrm.1 It is also one of the key issues multinationals
have to deal with when setting up a foreign aﬃliate. Multinationals often
have a choice between establishing a wholly owned subsidiary or sharing
ownership of an aﬃliate with local partners. Shared ownership may take the
form of majority or minority ownership, and may be established through the
acquisition of a stake in a local company, or through a joint venture or another
form of alliance that leads to the creation of a new business enterprise. We do
not focus on the exact process by which shared ownership is established, but
rather on possible reasons why ownership is shared. Throughout the paper,
we will use the terms shared ownership and joint venture interchangeably.
Consider a multinational enterprise that has to choose an ownership struc-
ture for its overseas aﬃliate. Will it assume whole ownership or share own-
ership with a local partner? If it chooses shared ownership, how large will
its share be? We examine these questions by constructing a model in which
the multinational faces no government restrictions on ownership and no ﬁ-
nancial constraints, and in which contracts can be written to ensure that the
aﬃliate’s ex-post proﬁt is maximized. We show that under these conditions
the proﬁt-maximizing choice of ownership structure entails shared ownership
if the following two conditions are met: (i) the local partner can contribute
potentially valuable assets to the investment project, such as market-speciﬁc
knowledge, a distribution network, or valuable contacts with potential cus-
tomers and suppliers; and (ii) the value of these assets is private information
of the local ﬁrm. The model predicts that in equilibrium the multinational’s
ownership share is increasing in the value of its own productive assets, with
the most productive multinationals always choosing whole ownership. We test
this prediction using Japanese ﬁrm-level data, and ﬁnd that it is consistent
with the ownership choices of Japanese multinationals.
Shared ownership is an empirically important phenomenon. In our data
1See, for instance, the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and
Moore (1990).
1on Japanese manufacturers, a sample of 1228 investments into manufacturing
aﬃliates located in 20 OECD countries that did not impose local ownership
requirements at the time of investment, some 58% of investments were wholly
owned, while 42% involved shared ownership.2 Of these joint ventures, nearly
half (49%) had a local ﬁrm as the principal investment partner, while 26%
were joint ventures between two Japanese companies, while some 10% were
investments between a previously established Japanese foreign aﬃliate and a
local ﬁrm. Thus, in some 60% of Japanese joint ventures, a local ﬁrm played
the role as the main investment partner. Within the joint venture arrange-
ments, we also ﬁnd that the equity ownership percentage of the principal
Japanese investor diﬀers across joint venture partner types. As shown in Ta-
ble 1, the principal Japanese investor typically owns a 45% share of the aﬃli-
ate when it contracts with a local ﬁrm to establish the aﬃliate, but over 60%
of the aﬃliate when in partnership with another Japanese ﬁrm (and slightly
more than this when the main partner is a member of the same keiretsu).
In addition, basic OLS and Tobit regression analysis (see Table 2) suggests
that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation, as indicated by its gross revenue, cash ﬂow,
and interest burden, has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on its ownership share.3
< Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here >
Absent any ﬁnancial constraints or local ownership requirements, a nec-
essary condition for a multinational to want to share ownership of its aﬃliate
with a local partner is that the partner contributes valuable assets or capa-
bilities. This is not a suﬃcient condition, however. If the markets for these
assets worked perfectly and the two parties could write complete contracts,
then the ownership structure would be indeterminate; the ﬁrms could simply
write contracts to coordinate how their assets are to be used. The ownership
structure therefore has to be a response to failures in the markets for these
assets. In the current paper, we take this market failure to be the result of
2Authors’ calculation. See Appendix A.5 for information on the dataset.
3While this in contrast to the Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002) result that suggests
ﬁnancial constraints (through Japanese bank credit problems) do play a role in FDI,
their study examined the number of Japanese aﬃliates established in the U.S., not their
ownership structure.
2incomplete information about the value of the local ﬁrm’s assets. Speciﬁcally
only a local ﬁrm knows how much its assets are worth. We show that this
adverse selection problem can be solved through shared ownership. By oﬀer-
ing the local ﬁrm a menu of contracts, consisting of a share of the aﬃliate’s
ex-post proﬁts and a transfer, the multinational can induce the local ﬁrm to
reveal its information. The intuition is simple: the menu can be structured
in such a way that a local ﬁrm with high-value assets would choose a con-
tract where it keeps a large share of the ex-post proﬁts and receives a small
transfer rather than picking a contract with a small ownership share and a
larger transfer, and vice versa for a local ﬁrm with less valuable assets.
Is there evidence that shared ownership of foreign aﬃliates is a response
to adverse selection? Several pieces of evidence suggest that this is indeed
the case. First, there is considerable evidence that adverse selection is an
important factor in shaping foreign investment decisions (see, for instance,
Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996, and Qiu and Zhou, 2006). Second, more than
half of all acquisitions of private companies, where adverse selection is a much
more severe problem than in the case of publicly traded companies, involve
so-called earn-outs (Real Business, 2007). Earn-outs are deals in which part of
the purchase price is paid ex post, contingent on speciﬁed levels of the seller’s
performance, typically sales or earnings. The seller retains a stake in the
company and hence in ex-post proﬁts for a speciﬁed time, possibly forever.
Such earn-outs are designed speciﬁcally to deal with situations where the
value of the acquisition target is private information. This is also conﬁrmed
by the fact that earn-outs are popular when entering new geographic markets
and in industries, such as information technology, where company values are
especially diﬃcult to determine (Harris, 2002).
Given this background, our modelling approach derives a set of contracts
oﬀered by a foreign ﬁrm to a potential target ﬁrm whose productivity is pri-
vate information.4 Based on the model results, we are able to derive testable
4This approach is similar to St¨ ahler (2005) who uses it to study cross-border mergers
but does not consider an outside option of the multinational. Note that our model also
diﬀers from the standard adverse selection literature, since the target ﬁrm’s outside option
depends on its type. For a general discussion of this kind of adverse selection models, see
Jullien (2000).
3predictions regarding the multinational’s ownership share in the aﬃliate. For
a given distribution of local ﬁrms’ assets, and controlling for the host-country
wage rate and market size, the ownership share of the multinational is in-
creasing in the multinational’s productivity. This prediction is conﬁrmed in
our empirical analysis.
We see our model as a complement to other approaches of explaining
shared ownership. Recall that in our model we assume implicitly that markets
work perfectly in all respects, except that there is adverse selection. In partic-
ular, the two parties can write complete contracts to solve ex-post incentive
problems, so that the aﬃliate’s proﬁt can be maximized and distributed
according to the agreed-upon sharing rule. In Nakamura and Xie (1998) con-
tract incompleteness is the market failure underlying shared ownership; there
is no information asymmetry. By retaining at least partial ownership of their
assets, ﬁrms retain some residual rights of control over their assets. These
control rights are assumed to help reduce technological spillovers and solve
agency problems in running the aﬃliate that cannot be solved through in-
centive contracts.5 The ownership share of the multinational then reﬂects the
bargaining power of the two parties. Related explanations of partial owner-
ship of foreign aﬃliates that are driven by the implicit assumption that it is
impossible to solve ex-post incentive problems include Asiedu and Esfahani
(2001) and Hennart (1991). In the former paper, incentive contracts fail be-
cause the parties cannot make any side-payments. In the latter paper, the
multinational is only interested in some of the assets of the local ﬁrm, and
will not buy the whole company if it is too costly to operate it ex post.6
In the next section we develop a model of shared ownership based on
adverse selection. In Section 3 we examine how shared ownership may help
the multinational overcome this problem, and in which situations the multi-
national will adopt this solution rather than pursue the investment project
5Note that earn-outs also help to solve such moral hazard problems, because they give
the seller an incentive ex post to stay with the company and to maximize proﬁt (Herrman,
2003).
6In our paper we explicitly abstract from host government intervention. Joint ventures
may of course be a response to such intervention (actual or anticipated). For further details
see, for instance, M¨ uller and Schnitzer (2006).
4without seeking a local partner. In Section 4 we confront the predictions of
the model with our Japanese ﬁrm-level data. Section 5 concludes. An Ap-
pendix contains proofs, data sources and tables.
2 A Model of Shared Ownership
We consider a multinational enterprise that has to decide how to establish an
aﬃliate in the host-country market and how to own it. The multinational’s
ﬁrst option is to undertake the investment entirely by itself and hence retain
whole ownership of its subsidiary. The multinational thus relies only on its
own productive assets, such as technology and marketing skills. For simplic-
ity, we refer to this option as “greenﬁeld investment”. The second option
is to undertake the investment in cooperation with a local ﬁrm. This co-
operation involves the combination of the multinational’s assets with those
of the local ﬁrm and includes a contract specifying a payment T from the
multinational to the local ﬁrm for the use of its assets and a sharing rule for
the resulting proﬁt, where s denotes the share left to the local partner. We
call this option a “joint venture”. Whether this cooperation takes the form
of an actual joint venture or a (partial) merger does not matter. Assuming
that the two parties can write suﬃciently complete contracts to ensure that
the cooperation leads to an ex-post maximization of the venture’s proﬁt, the
only aspect of ownership that matters is that it provides a contractual claim
on the venture’s ex-post proﬁts.7 To avoid the uninteresting case where the
multinational has no choice but to take on a local partner, we assume that
greenﬁeld investment always yields strictly positive proﬁts.
Due to quasi-linear preferences in the host country, demand is given by
the inverse demand function p = a − bQ. The marginal cost of a local ﬁrm i
is c(αi) = w − αi with w − αi < a and αi ∈ [α,α]; w denotes the local wage
7Whether ownership conveys residual rights of control over assets is of no relevance
in our complete contracting framework. In another paper, we distinguish between joint
ventures and acquisitions such that joint ventures do not coordinate outputs; see Raﬀ,
Ryan and St¨ ahler (2007). In the paper here, we do not consider the merger paradox
which arises in case of an acquisition which coordinates outputs. The merger paradox
would not change our results substantially. Furthermore, we do not have data on market
concentration on an industry level.
5rate, and α stands for the size of the assets and hence productivity. There
are n local ﬁrms, and each local ﬁrm knows each rival’s marginal cost. The
multinational, however, is not able to observe an individual ﬁrm’s produc-
tivity but can derive the aggregate and average size of assets in this market.
This assumption means that the multinational can observe the overall per-
formance of the market but cannot observe individual market shares. The
aggregate assets of all local ﬁrms are denoted by A ≡
P
n αi, and for future
convenience we deﬁne Ω ≡ a − w − A and Φi ≡ Ω + αi.
If the multinational enters the host market through greenﬁeld investment,
it has to carry a ﬁxed cost of size F, which can be thought of including the
cost of gaining market information and establishing a distribution network,
that it would otherwise obtain from its joint venture partner. The marginal
cost of the multinational producing via a greenﬁeld investment is equal to
c∗ = w − β > 0 with β ≥ α; hence the multinational is assumed to be
more productive than local ﬁrms. In the case of greenﬁeld investment, n + 1
independent ﬁrms are active in the host market, and since the multinational
knows the aggregate assets of all local ﬁrms, the equilibrium can be derived
in the standard Cournot-Nash fashion.8
In case of a joint venture with a local ﬁrm, the marginal cost of the
venture will be equal to cv = w−γ(αi+β) > 0, where γ measures the degree
of complementarity between assets. For γ < 1 the multinational’s assets and
local ﬁrms’ assets are not perfectly complementary. For γ > 1, the combined
assets are even more valuable than their sum. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that Ω−(γ−1)α−γβ+(n+1)α > 0 which guarantees that each local
ﬁrm will continue to produce after the multinational has formed a venture
with a competing local ﬁrm.9
We assume that one local ﬁrm is willing to form a joint venture with the
multinational. The game we consider has three stages: in the ﬁrst stage, the
8Bergstrom and Varian (1985) show that a Cournot equilibrium depends only on ag-
gregate marginal costs and not on their distribution. The multinational therefore does not
have to know the distribution of individual productivities but only the size of aggregate
assets when determining its optimal production level.
9Permitting market exit would not change our results substantially, but would make
the analysis tedious due to possibly discontinuous reaction functions.
6multinational makes a proposal to the local ﬁrm. This proposal will specify
a menu of contract oﬀers (T(α),s(α)) from the multinational to the target
ﬁrm. In the second stage, the target ﬁrm will accept one oﬀer or will reject
them all. In case of acceptance, the deal is done as agreed; in case of rejection,
the target ﬁrm stays independent and the multinational enters the market
via greenﬁeld investment. Finally, the active ﬁrms then play a Cournot game.
3 The Equilibrium Ownership Structure
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we examine the multinational’s de-
cision under complete information. The ownership structure of a joint venture
will be indeterminate in this case. Nevertheless we can establish several useful
preliminary results. Second, we derive the equilibrium ownership structure
under incomplete information and provide comparative static results.
3.1 Complete Information
Let the case of greenﬁeld investment be denoted by the superscript G. The
equilibrium proﬁt levels of the multinational (denoted by an asterisk) and of
a local ﬁrm i in the case of greenﬁeld investment are respectively equal to
Π
∗G =
(Ω + (n + 1)β)2




(Φi − β + (n + 1)αi)2
b(n + 2)2 .
The assumption that greenﬁeld FDI is always proﬁtable hence is equivalent
to Π∗G > 0. We will refer to ΠG
i as the independent proﬁts of a potential
partner ﬁrm i.
The proﬁts of a joint venture and those of a local ﬁrm j that is not part of




(Φi + nγ(αi + β))2




(Φi − γ(αi + β) + (n + 1)αj)2
b(n + 1)2 .
Any combination (T(αi),s(αi)) that will leave a local ﬁrm i of type αi at least
a proﬁt equal to its outside option of refusing the joint venture, namely ΠG
i ,
will be accepted by this ﬁrm. A joint venture with ﬁrm i is hence preferred






The ﬁrst result characterizes the multinational’s preferences over green-
ﬁeld FDI and joint venture for any level of a target ﬁrm’s assets:
Lemma 1 For any possible αi there exists a critical value of β, such that
the multinational prefers greenﬁeld FDI to a joint venture for any β above
the critical value.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Hence a multinational will always choose greenﬁeld FDI, if it has suf-
ﬁciently many assets. If it does not, it will consider a joint venture. This
decision is also aﬀected by host country characteristics, such as market size
(measured by parameter b) and wage rate. Taking the derivative of ∆ with
respect to b and w, we obtain:
Lemma 2 The multinational is more likely to prefer greenﬁeld FDI to a joint
venture the bigger is the host market and, provided that Φi is suﬃciently big
and/or γ is small, the lower is the host wage.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
The next result establishes that in case of a joint venture the multinational
would like the target ﬁrm to have as many assets as possible, provided that
certain conditions hold.
8Lemma 3 ∆ increases with αi, if γ ≥ 1 or γ < 1 but not too small.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Lemmas 1 and 3 establish that for a comparison between greenﬁeld in-
vestment and joint venture we have to distinguish between three cases:
1. ∆(α,β) ≥ Π∗G: all targets are proﬁtable,
2. ∆(α,β) ≤ Π∗G: no target is proﬁtable,
3. ∆(α,β) < Π∗G, ∆(α,β) > Π∗G: some (high asset) targets are proﬁtable.
Consider now Case 3, and deﬁne the critical asset level ˜ α such that
∆(˜ α,β) = Π∗G(β). We would like to establish how this critical value changes
with β. An increase in β has three eﬀects: (i) it raises the proﬁt from green-
ﬁeld FDI; (ii) it raises the proﬁt from a joint venture; and (iii) it reduces
the transfer that the multinational has to make to the target ﬁrm. Obviously
we have to introduce further conditions, if we are to say anything about
the relative change in these proﬁts. The following result provides suﬃcient
conditions for the critical value to increase with β.
Lemma 4 ˜ α is increasing in β, if β is suﬃciently big and γ is not too large.
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
Lemma 4 shows that the ﬁrst eﬀect, that is raising the proﬁt from green-
ﬁeld FDI, dominates the other two eﬀects if the multinational is already suf-
ﬁciently productive and the gains from forming a joint venture are not too
large. In this case, an increase in the multinational’s productivity requires
a higher productivity of the target ﬁrm in order to keep the joint venture
attractive for the multinational.
3.2 Incomplete Information
Under incomplete information the multinational will oﬀer a menu of joint
venture oﬀers (T(α),s(α)), from which the target ﬁrm will pick one.10 We
10For convenience, we drop the subscript in this subsection and use α only.
9ﬁrst use the standard tools of principal-agent theory to characterize the op-
timal sharing rule and to derive conditions under which there exists a fully
separating equilibrium in which by selecting a contract the target ﬁrm re-
veals its true α. We then derive comparative static results concerning the
local ﬁrm’s ownership share that we can use to inform our empirical analy-
sis.
Consider the accept-or-reject decision of the target ﬁrm. The target ﬁrm
is free to accept any oﬀer it wants to, and by doing so to pretend to be of a
certain type which may not be its true type. Let U(α, ˆ α) denote the payoﬀ
of a target ﬁrm of type α which accepts an oﬀer designed for type ˆ α:




Both T and s depend on ˆ α because the foreign ﬁrm cannot observe the tar-
get’s assets. The independent proﬁts and the cooperative proﬁts, however, de-
pend on the true size of assets. Consider two diﬀerent target ﬁrms with assets
α0 and α00, respectively. True revelation requires that U(α0,α0) ≥ U(α0,α00)






















00)) ≥ 0 (5)
which demonstrates that true revelation requires that s increases with α. The
intuition is straightforward: a low-asset ﬁrm can be prevented from picking
an oﬀer designed for a high-asset ﬁrm only if the share of ex-post proﬁts is
large for the high-asset ﬁrm.
True revelation requires that each type picks the oﬀer which is designed
for this type. That is,







∗V(α) = 0. (6)
10Using this condition, we ﬁnd that payoﬀs change with the type as follows:
dU
dα








The optimal contract of the multinational for those types with which a joint
venture is more proﬁtable than a greenﬁeld investment makes target ﬁrms
indiﬀerent between accepting the contract and rejecting it, that is,
U(˜ α) = 0,
dU
dα
= 0,∀α ∈ [˜ α,α], (8)
which implies








(n + 1)3((n + 1)α − β + Φ)
(n + 2)2nγ(nγ(α + β) + Φ)
. (9)
We can now establish the following result concerning the existence of a sep-
arating equilibrium:
Proposition 1 A fully separating equilibrium for all types α ∈ [˜ α,α] exists.





(n + 1)3(nγ(n + 2)β + (n + 1 − nγ)Φ
nγ(n + 1)2(nγ(α + β) + Φ)2 > 0 (10)
because nγ(n + 2)β + (n + 1 − nγ)Φ = nγ(β(n + 2) − Φ) + (n − 1)Φ > 0 as
β(n + 2) > Φ.¤
Having characterized the optimal ownership share of the local ﬁrm, we
may now examine its comparative-static properties. First, consider how the
equilibrium ownership share of a local ﬁrm of asset size α changes with the





(n + 1)3(nγ(n + 2)α + (nγ + 1)Φ)
(n + 2)2nγ(nγ(α + β) + Φ)2 < 0. (11)
11That is, the more productive is the multinational, the lower is the ownership
share it leaves to the local ﬁrm. The reason for this can best be seen in (9):
a higher β raises the joint venture proﬁt, Π∗V, and reduces the proﬁt of an
independent local ﬁrm if the multinational chooses greenﬁeld FDI, ΠG
i . Hence
the multinational is able to reduce s without deterring the local ﬁrm.
Second, note that s∗ is independent of market size parameter b, but de-





3 (nγ(β + α) + β − (n + 1)α)
(nγ(n + 2)2(nγ(β + α) + Φ)2 ,
with the sign depending on the value of γ. If γ < ((n + 1)α − β)/n(α + β),
the sign is negative and s∗ increases with the host wage. These results are
summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 The local ﬁrm’s ownership share s∗ (i) decreases with the
multinational’s productivity; (ii) is independent of host market size; and (iii)
increases with the host wage, provided that γ is suﬃciently small.
4 Empirical Evidence
Our model predicts that the multinational’s productivity aﬀects the decision
on whether to share ownership of an overseas aﬃliate with a local ﬁrms and,
if yes, how large a stake to leave to the local partner. The most productive
multinationals retain whole ownership for their aﬃliates. When we do have
joint ownership, the local ﬁrm’s ownership share is decreasing in the multi-
national’s productivity. The role of host market size is less straightforward.
According to Lemma 2, the larger the host market the more likely it is that
the multinational established a greenﬁeld subsidiary without a local partner.
However, if the multinational takes on a local partner, then the ownership
share should be independent of market size. The eﬀect of the host’s wage
rate is ambiguous as it depends on the size of γ, which we do not observe.
We examine these results in two ways: ﬁrst, we carry out Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) stochastic dominance tests to investigate whether there are
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the productivity distributions of parent
12companies depending on their choice of aﬃliate ownership structure.11 Sec-
ond, we carry out regression analysis with a full set of parent ﬁrm-, aﬃliate-,
and host-speciﬁc variables to examine how these characteristics aﬀect the
local partner’s ownership share.
Table 3 provides the results of our K-S tests concerning diﬀerences in the
TFP distribution of parents across ownership structures.
< Insert Table 3 about here >
The “F = S ” column reports the coeﬃcient on the two-sided K-S (equal-
ity of the two distributions) test, while the remaining columns report on
the one-sided K-S tests indicating F’s distribution stochastically dominates
(“F ≤ S ”), or is stochastically dominated by S’s distribution (“S ≤ F ”)
(see Appendix A.6 for details on how these tests were implemented). The
reported coeﬃcients are the D-statistics, the maximum diﬀerence between
the two distributions. The D-statistic is measured as S(z) − F(z), so non-
negative coeﬃcients are expected when F stochastically dominates S, and
negative coeﬃcients when S stochastically dominates F. K-S tests are pair-
wise, so to compare parent TFPs across aﬃliate ownership structures, we
must run multiple K-S tests. Results from the two-sided tests indicate the
presence of signiﬁcant TFP diﬀerences between the parent ﬁrms of greenﬁeld
subsidiaries, majority-owned JVs, and minority-owned JVs. In addition, the
one-sided test results reveal TFPs drawn from ﬁrms establishing greenﬁeld
aﬃliates stochastically dominate TFPs drawn from ﬁrms establishing both
majority- and minority-owned JVs. When focusing on the diﬀerent JV types,
we ﬁnd that TFPs drawn from parent ﬁrms establishing majority-owned JVs
stochastically dominate TFPs from parent ﬁrms establishing minority owned
JVs. Combined, these results suggest a rank ordering (by decreasing TFP of
11Recently, stochastic dominance tests have been used to evaluate TFP diﬀerences across
ﬁrms selling only domestically, ﬁrms that also export, and multinational ﬁrms. These
tests show that the most productive ﬁrms in an industry are multinationals, while less
productive ﬁrms export their products abroad, and the least productive ﬁrms sell only on
the domestic market. See, for instance, Delgado, Farinas and Ruano (2001) and Girma,
Kneller and Pisu (2005).
13the parent) of greenﬁeld subsidiary/majority-owned JV/minority-owned JV,
as is suggested by our theory.
While K-S tests are informative, we are unfortunately limited to analyz-
ing a single ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristic in each set of tests. Thus, we turn
our attention to more traditional regression analysis to better analyze the
ownership choices ﬁrms make when establishing their foreign aﬃliates. Our
theoretical model suggests that a ﬁrm has to make two decisions, namely to
choose between greenﬁeld investment and joint venture and, in case of a joint
venture, to determine what ownership share to leave to the local partner.
We ﬁrst analyze the determinants of the local ﬁrm’s ownership share
within joint venture aﬃliates. In the ﬁrst set of empirical tests (Table 4), we
use the local ﬁrm’s ownership share as the dependent variable. Given that the
Japanese multinational has to own at least a 10% share of the aﬃliate in order
for the investment to be classiﬁed as FDI (rather than portfolio investment),
and for joint ventures is limited to a 95% share, the local partner’s ownership
share is bounded between 5% and 90%.12 As such, a Tobit speciﬁcation is
employed to examine the local ﬁrm’s ownership share. We follow Smith and
Blundell (1986) in using a two-stage instrumental variables Tobit technique in
order to deal with potential endogeneity problems within our data, especially
in regard to TFP. In the ﬁrst stage, we generate residual terms from linear
regressions of the possibly endogenous regressors on their instruments and
the other exogenous regressors. For the second stage, we estimate a standard
Tobit model, including the residuals from the ﬁrst step. We use one-year
lagged values of TFP, Host Wage, Host Size, and Keiretsu membership as
the instruments, which provides the additional beneﬁt of controlling for the
time period between the FDI decision and aﬃliate establishment.
< Insert Table 4 about here >
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 provide the results of our base regression,
in which only the parent ﬁrm’s TFP and the host’s wage are included.13
12The 95% cutoﬀ to determine a wholly owned aﬃliate is standard; lowering this cutoﬀ
to 90% does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our results.
13Data collection and speciﬁcations are detailed in Appendix A.5.
14The negative coeﬃcient on TFP indicates that an increase in the TFP of
the Japanese parent reduces the ownership share of the local partner, as
predicted by our model. We also ﬁnd that an increase in the host’s industry-
level average wage rate leads to a lower ownership share of the partner.14
In columns (3)-(5), we include several other ﬁrm and aﬃliate character-
istics that might be expected to inﬂuence the ownership share decision. In
column (3) we ﬁnd that previous investment into a particular host by the
Japanese parent tends to increase the ownership share of the partner ﬁrm.
In column (4) we add an indicator of aﬃliate-parent diversity, where the in-
vestment takes the value 1 for aﬃliates established in industries outside of
the parent’s main industry (at the 2-digit level). The positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on the diversity variable indicates that multinationals are more
likely to leave a larger ownership share to the local partner in aﬃliates lo-
cated outside their main business line than for those in it, suggesting the
necessity to rely on local ﬁrm’s greater expertise in those markets.15 This is
consistent with our model, speciﬁcally with the assumption that local ﬁrms
have to contribute assets (such as expertise) to the joint venture, but have
private information about the value of these assets. Column (5) reveals that
keiretsu membership of the parent does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect ownership
share. Finally, we include a measure of host GDP (column 6) to conﬁrm
our theoretical result indicating that the ownership share is independent of
host market size. Our results in column (6) use a host’s industry-level value
added as the measure of market size, and we ﬁnd that this indeed does not
aﬀect the partner’s ownership share. Similar results are found (although not
reported) when we use the host’s GDP as the market size measure.
While the above results suggest that greater parent ﬁrm TFP leads to
a lower local ownership share, a potential selection bias exists in the fact
that we are (in this case) only examining the TFP of Japanese ﬁrms that
select joint ventures. As a result, columns (6) and (7) provide the results of a
14This would be consistent with our model for high levels of γ. However, we might also
pick up the eﬀect that if wages are high because of high labor productivity, Japanese ﬁrms
might want to own a larger share of the aﬃliate.
15While our data provides the name of joint venture partners, data on host-based part-
ners is often quite limited.
15Heckman (1979) two-step test, which control for the parent ﬁrm’s likelihood
of selecting a joint venture. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst stage uses a probit model to
examine the ﬁrm’s ownership ”choice”, where the dependent variable equals
1 if the ﬁrm chooses a joint venture, and 0 otherwise. Using the parameter
estimates from this ﬁrst step, we are able to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio,
which is used as a regressor in the second stage Tobit estimation, in which the
local ﬁrm’s ”share” is determined. The results from the second stage of the
Heckman estimation reveal similar results to our two-stage Tobit estimation;
however, the insigniﬁcant Inverse Mills Ratio suggests that selection bias is
not a problem, and that the use of the two-stage Tobit is appropriate.
As our above Tobit models estimate a linear relationship between owner-
ship share and the independent variables, it is useful to conﬁrm the robustness
of these results to other model speciﬁcations. One such method is to focus
on the type of joint venture formed by the Japanese parent, which captures
indirectly the ownership share of the partner ﬁrm. In regard to joint venture
formation, we allow the Japanese ﬁrm to choose between three forms of joint
ventures: a majority-owned JV (MajJV), where the Japanese parent owns
between 50.1% and 95% of the aﬃliate (leaving between 5% and 49.9% for
its partner); an equal partnership joint venture, where each ﬁrm owns 50% of
the aﬃliate (50/50); and a minority-owned JV (MinJV), where the Japanese
ﬁrm owns between 10% and 49.9% of the aﬃliate. Table 5 provides the results
of multinomial logit (MNL) regression analysis, where the base case for the
analysis is the majority-owned JV; that is, a positive (negative) coeﬃcient
estimate suggests a greater (lower) likelihood of selection as compared to a
majority-owned JV.
< Insert Table 5 about here >
Given that these categories are ordered by decreasing level of Japanese
parental ownership, it is not surprising that our multinomial logit results
mimic our Tobit estimation results. A Japanese parent’s TFP is signiﬁ-
cantly lower in the 50/50 split and minority-owned joint ventures than in
the majority-owned aﬃliates, with a more signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
majority- and minority-owned aﬃliates than between majority-owned and
1650/50 split aﬃliates. Host country wage rates only slightly lower the likeli-
hood of a 50/50 split aﬃliate as compared to a majority-owned JV, but more
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the choice of minority-owned JVs. Thus, the higher the
wage rate, the more likely the ﬁrm chooses a majority-owned JV. Finally, the
eﬀects of our other aforementioned control variables (previous investment, af-
ﬁliate diversity, keiretsu membership, and host size results) are conﬁrmed in
the MNL framework.
Having examined the choice of ownership shares within joint venture af-
ﬁliates, we next turn our attention to the greenﬁeld-joint venture decision
made by the Japanese multinational. That is, we do not consider the owner-
ship share given to the partner ﬁrm, but rather whether the Japanese MNE
takes a partner at all. Our theory suggests that TFP and host market size will
positively aﬀect the choice of establishing a greenﬁeld investment, while the
eﬀect of the host’s wage is indeterminate. In Table 6 we examine the ﬁrm’s
choice of ownership structure via a binomial logit model, where the base
case is greenﬁeld investment. Thus, positive (negative) coeﬃcients suggest a
greater (lesser) likelihood of establishing a greenﬁeld aﬃliate.
< Insert Table 6 about here >
Columns (1)-(3) highlight the estimation results from our base theoreti-
cal framework, while columns (4)-(6) add the other ﬁrm- and aﬃliate-speciﬁc
characteristics. For our base framework, we ﬁnd robust support for the notion
that a Japanese parent’s TFP and a host’s industry-level value added pos-
itively aﬀect greenﬁeld investment selection. Higher host-speciﬁc industry-
level wages tend to increase joint venture selection. Combined with our pre-
vious results, it appears that higher host wages lead to a greater likelihood
of majority-owned JVs as compared to the other forms of potential owner-
ship structures. We do ﬁnd that previous investment increases joint venture
selection, as does aﬃliate diversity, which is consistent with our theory. We
also ﬁnd that keiretsu membership of the parent has no statistical aﬀect on
ownership structure.
175 Conclusions
This paper argued that multinationals tend to share ownership of foreign
aﬃliates with a local partner if the latter has (i) potentially valuable assets
to contribute to the investment project, and (ii) private information about
the value of these assets. Shared ownership in this case acts as a screen-
ing mechanism to separate those local ﬁrms with valuable assets from those
with less valuable assets. The model predicted that, controlling for the host
country’s market size and wage costs, the multinational’s ownership share is
increasing in the value of its own productive assets, with the most productive
multinationals always choosing whole ownership. We tested this prediction
using Japanese ﬁrm-level data, and found that it was consistent with the
ownership choices of Japanese multinationals.
How ownership of a foreign aﬃliate is allocated between a multinational
and a local company obviously has implications for the host country’s so-
cial welfare. A direct eﬀect comes from the sharing of proﬁts and technology
between the multinational and the local ﬁrm. Indirect eﬀects arise because
ownership inﬂuences investors’ incentives to commit technological and man-
agement resources to the project. An examination of these eﬀects is beyond
the scope of the current paper. However, to the extent that a multinational
ﬁrm has a say in the ownership decision and is not simply forced to take on a
local partner, our model might serve as a building block of such an analysis.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The multinational prefers greenﬁeld FDI to a joint venture if Π∗G+ΠG
i ≥ Π∗V,
or
(Φi − αi + (n + 1)β)2
b(n + 2)2 +
(Φi − β + (n + 1)αi)2
b(n + 2)2 − F ≥
(Φi + nγ(αi + β))2
b(n + 1)2 .
(A.1)
Consider the multinational’s indiﬀerence curve between greenﬁeld FDI and
joint venture with β on the horizontal axis and αi on the vertical axis. This
18curve must lie everywhere on or below a line with a slope of −1. To see this,
suppose we increase β and reduce αi by the same amount, i.e., dβ = −dαi.
This leaves the right-hand side of (A.1) unchanged. To keep the left-hand




nΦi + (n2 + 2n + 2)β − 2(n + 1)αi
nΦi + (n2 + 2n + 2)αi − 2(n + 1)β
. (A.2)
Note that if β = αi, then
dαi









¯ > 1. Hence starting at β = αi and increasing β by
increments dβ means that αi has to fall by more than dβ to keep the left-
hand side of (A.1) constant. As one continues to raise β, the denominator
of (A.2) may become negative; this implies that the line representing the
combinations of β and αi for which the left-hand side of (A.1) stays constant
ﬁrst becomes vertical and then bends backward so that both β and αi have
to fall to keep the left-hand side of (A.1) the same. The indiﬀerence curve
between greenﬁeld investment and joint venture must have a slope that lies
between −1 (the value that keeps the right-hand side of (A.1) unchanged)
and (A.2). Hence greenﬁeld FDI is preferred if β is suﬃciently big.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider (A.1). An increase in market size (lower b) makes greenﬁeld FDI
more attractive as does a lower F and a smaller γ. The impact of a reduction











2 − 2(n + 1) − 1)Φ1 + n(αi + β)((n + 1)




The derivative is positive if Φi is suﬃciently large and/or γ is small; in this
case, a reduction in the wage makes greenﬁeld investment more likely relative
to a joint venture.





2nγ((nγ(αi + β) + Φi)
b(n + 1)2 −
2(n + 1)((n + 1)αi − β + Φi)
b(n + 2)2 . (A.3)
First, observe that n/(n + 1)2 > (n + 1)/(n + 2)2. Hence, ∆ increases with
αi if
γ(nγ(αi + β) + Φi) > (n + 1)αi − β + Φi.
This condition is fulﬁlled for γ ≥ 1 or γ not too small because β ≥ αi.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Deﬁne the indiﬀerence between joint venture and greenﬁeld investment as an
implicit function f(˜ α,β) ≡ ∆(˜ α,β) − Π∗G(β), such that d˜ α/dβ = −fβ/fα.
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This condition holds if γ is not too large and β is suﬃciently big.
A.5 Data Sources
• Japanese outward FDI data for the period 1985-2001 was compiled from
several issues of Toyo Keizai Inc.’s Japanese Overseas Investment: A
complete listing by ﬁrms and countries. The countries included in this
sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and the UK. This dataset provides the equity ownership share
of the Japanese parent as well as for any local partner ﬁrm.
20• Firm-level ﬁnancial data is found in the Paciﬁc Basin Capital Markets
(PACAP) database. Gross revenue is calculated as sales divided by
total assets, while interest burden is calculated as interest payments
divided by sales, and cash ﬂow is calculated as (gross proﬁt-income
tax payments + depreciation charges) divided by total assets. Keiretsu
membership is determined through data located in Dodwell Marketing’s
Industrial Groupings in Japan. All data is collected for the year prior
to each investment.
• Host GDP (constant US$) was found in the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Indicators CD-ROM. Industry-level value added (constant
US$) is found in the OECD’s STAN database. Wage data (constant
US$) comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Conversions to
US$, when necessary, use exchange rates provided by the IMF’s Inter-
national Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
• TFP values are computed for each parent ﬁrm for the year prior to
each investment, using the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial data found in the PACAP
database. Given our data availability, and the number of zero observa-
tions in the ﬁrms’ investment data, we employ the Levinsohn-Petrin
(2003) method in STATA to calculate the ﬁrms’ TFP values. The
Levinsohn-Petrin estimation technique to determine TFP corrects for
the simultaneity bias that may arise when productivity can be observed
by the ﬁrm but not the econometrician.
A.6 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Stochastic dominance tests work in the following way: suppose we have the
cumulative productivity distribution functions of two ﬁrm-types (F,S). For
F to ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate S, we require F(z) − S(z) ≤0 for
some z ² R. Note that for some z strict equality is possible, enabling ﬁrms
with identical TFP to choose diﬀerent aﬃliate ownership structures (and
allowing us to focus on the more robust picture of diﬀerences across the two
distributions). To test for stochastic dominance, we employ both one-sided
21and two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests. The null-hypotheses of the
one- and two-sided tests are as follows:
H0:F(z) − S(z) ≤ 0 ∀z ² R vs. H1:F(z) − S(z) > 0 for some z ² R
and
H0:F(z) − S(z) = 0 ∀z ² R vs. H1:F(z) − S(z) 6= 0 for some z ² R
For F to stochastically dominate S, we must both reject the two-sided K-S
test’s null hypothesis and fail to reject the one-sided K-S test’s null hypoth-
esis.
22A.7 Tables
Table 1: Equity Ownership Shares of Principal Japanese Investors
Other Japanese Firm Prev. Estab. Aﬃliate Local Firm Local Firm∗
Mean 60.63 68.07 45.97 44.07
Std. Dev. (17.41) (20.37) (20.30) (21.38)
* Main parent is Previously Established Foreign Aﬃliate.
Table 2: Tests of Equity Ownership Percentages in Japanese Foreign Aﬃliates
Full Sample Joint Ventures
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Total Factor Productivity 2.388b 2.350b 1.175b 1.174b
(1.061) (0.956) (0.651) (0.640)
Gross Revenue 13.339 13.508 11.010 11.012
(8.115) (8.946) (6.877) (6.809)
Cash Flow 19.548 18.373 27.539 27.529
(30.551) (29.860) (17.659) (17.415)
Interest Burden 279.116 275.438 228.499 228.485
(184.558) (181.405) (132.869) (132.447)
Prev. Investment into Country -1.158 -1.198 1.910 1.909
(1.727) (1.719) (1.896) (1.870)
No. of Observations 586 586 298 298
F-Test 5.83 27.22 3.36 19.90
Prob > F 0.016 0.001 0.003 0.003
Adj R2 0.1259 0.108 0.153 0.148
Standard Deviations in parenthesis. a,b,c – signiﬁcant at the 1%,5%, and 10% levels.
23Table 3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Principal Investor’s TFP
Comparison Group (F vs. S) F = S F ≤ S S ≤ F
Greenﬁeld vs. All JVs 0.1339a 0.1339a -0.0002
Greenﬁeld vs. Majority JVs 0.1206c 0.1206c -0.0061
Greenﬁeld vs. Minority JVs 0.2026a 0.2026a -0.0000
Majority JVs vs. Minority JVs 0.1602c 0.1602c -0.0526


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 6: The Aﬃliate Ownership Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Factor Productivity 0.086b 0.085b 0.083b 0.083b 0.079b 0.078c
Host Wage . -0.018c -0.018c -0.017c -0.016c -0.013c
Host Size . . 0.017c 0.016c 0.016c 0.015c
Previous Investment . . . -0.081c -0.079c -0.079c
Aﬃliate Diversity . . . . -0.317c -0.317c
Keiretsu Membership . . . . . -0.177
Host/Industry/Time Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. of Observations 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
LR-test 9.28 9.31 9.34 9.42 9.51 9.52
Prob > F or Prob > χ2 0.032 0.029 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.023
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.117 0.121 0.124 0.127 0.128
Note: Logit speciﬁcation (1=greenﬁeld; 0= JV). a,b,c – signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and
10%-levels, respectively.
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